Watermarking with both oblivious detection and high robustness capabilities is still a challenging problem. The existing methods are either robust or oblivious, but it is di cult to achieve both goals simultaneously. In this paper, we tackle the above-mentioned problem. Our basic design methodology is to exploit prior knowledge available at the detector side and then use it to design a \non-blind" embedder. We prove that the proposed scheme can resist two famous denoising-based attacks, which h a ve successfully cracked many existing watermarking schemes. False negative and false positive analyses are conducted to verify the performance of our scheme. The experimental results show that the new method is indeed powerful.
1 Introduction Watermarking 8, 18, 21] is a technique which conceals one or more watermarks in a medium. Embedded watermarks can be used to declare rightful ownership (robust watermarking), to authenticate credibility (fragile watermarking) or to carry useful information (captioning watermarking). Usually, a watermark itself can bearandom signal, a meaningful message, or a company's logo. An e ective watermarking scheme should satisfy a set of typical requirements, including transparency, robustness, oblivious (blind) detection, and so on. The main purpose of robust watermarking is to prevent hidden watermark(s) from being removed or destroyed so that ownership can be guaranteed. Watermarks can be detected with the help of the host media (called non-oblivious detection) or without access to the original media (called oblivious detection). Oblivious detection is practical but is still a challenge if high robustness is the major concern. Since the original source cannot be used in oblivious detection, the embedded watermark should bepredicted from an attacked media. Under these circumstances, the predicted watermark values more or less deviate from their original ones. In other words, the degree of robustness will be a ected. Therefore, robustness and oblivious detection are, in e ect, in con ict with each other. However, if one can nd a good watermark prediction scheme and then use it as part of the design methodology, then the degree of robustness degradation can be minimized. In this paper, we aim to tackle the above-mentioned problem using image watermarking as our domain.
Watermarking with oblivious (blind) detection 1, 10, 11 , 22] has been extensively explored in recent years. Most of the existing methods detect watermarks by means of prediction, and this kind of strategy usually is not directly related to its hiding strategy. Therefore, robustness cannot beguaranteed. In 23], Voloshynovskiy et al. proposed a stochastic model to seriously address the watermark prediction problem. Since an oblivious approach usually detects watermarks by means of prediction, it is also possible that a pirate may successfully remove a n e m bedded watermark by means of prediction. Voloshynovskiy et al. 24 ] called this kind of attack a \denoising and remodulation attack." In some situations, a predicted watermark may be maliciously added to another cover image that belongs to other people. This kind of attack aims to create the false positive problem. Kutter et al. 12 ] called this kind of attack a \copy attack." Since the aforementioned two attacks are very di cult to resist, any w atermarking approach that claims to be robust may b e c r a c ked when either of the two attacks is encountered. Since a predicted watermark (for oblivious detection) may sacri ce robustness to some extent, we propose to design a watermarking system by taking both the embedding strategy and the detection strategy together into consideration. In other words, the characteristics of a predetermined detection model can be used as part of the criteria for designing a better watermarking system. In 4], Cox et al. proposed a new concept which views watermarking as communications with side information. This concept makes it possible to design a new watermarking method with better e ciency. In 17], Miller et al. adopted a similar concept 4] to design four di erent informed embedding strategies.
In this paper, we present a novel watermarking scheme which exploits the available information at the watermark detection (prediction) side. Based on the information obtained from the prediction side, we are able to use these prior information as part of the criteria for designing a better embedder. We shall take the shrinkage-based denoising model as our watermark prediction module 16] because it naturally leads to blind detection. Since the shrinkage-based denoising approach 6, 9] adopts a soft-thresholding strategy to \gradually" decrease the magnitude of selected coe cients, it is more linear and easy to control the behaviors of denoising. Since the knowledge at the detector side is used to design an embedder, we call it a \non-blind" embedder. In sum, the proposed system is composed of a non-blind embedder and a blind detector. We shall analyze the performance of our scheme when denoising-based attacks 12, 24] are encountered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, oblivious watermark detection formulated as a denoising problem is described. In Sec. 3, the proposed scheme is described, and some performance analyses are discussed. Finally, experimental results are given in Sec. 4 and concluding remarks made in Sec. 5.
Formulating Oblivious Detection as Watermark Prediction by means of Shrinkage-based Denoising
In this paper, oblivious watermark detection is formulated as a watermark prediction problem. Under the assumption that a watermark hiding/attacking process is modeled as a noise adding process, we can separate an embedded watermark from an attacked image by using the shrinkage-based denoising technique. Under the circumstances, the separated noise can be regarded as an extracted watermark, which more or less deviates from its original shape due to the execution of denoising and the e ects of attacks. Based on observation that the shrinkage operation tends to gradually decrease the magnitude of transformed coe cients, we propose to use shrinkage-based denoising to predict this noise (watermark). In the following, we will use the sparse code shrinkage (SCS) 9] strategy to model the watermark prediction process since it is a generalization of shrinkage-based image denoising methods. In Secs. 2.1 and 2.2, we shall describe in detail how to model the above-mentioned processes by means of Gaussian modeling. Next, we will discuss how to use the SCS strategy to solve the denoising problem in Sec. 2.3.
Gaussian Modeling of Coe cient Magnitude Update in the Hiding Process
Let X bean image, let A bea modulation operation in the hiding process, and let bea wavelet function. Let the wavelet transformed image be X in the space-frequency domain. For wavelet-based watermarking, the result of modulating X by m e a n s o f A is a watermarked image, X A, where is a convolution operation. X A can be converted into another form:
according to the associativity of convolution, where X A s is a modulated image in the spatial domain and A s is the spatial version of A. The above equation indicates that the wavelet transform (using ) o f t h e w atermarked image X A s is equivalent to the modulation (using A) o f a w avelet transformed image X . Now, suppose a watermark has beenembeddedinto a host image in the wavelet domain. This means that the original image X is rst wavelet transformed using and then modulated using A.
Under these circumstances, the modulated wavelet coe cients can be modeled as the original wavelet coe cients plus Gaussian noise added in the wavelet domain. That is, x(j) = x(j) + N(j). Therefore, the watermarked image can be modeled as X = X + N (3) where N is the noise sequence.X is equivalent t o X A s in Eq. (1).
Gaussian Modeling of Coe cient Magnitude Update in the Attacking Process
After watermark hiding, the watermarked image can betransmitted over the Internet and may be attacked by a n y process. At this time, the model of an attack is assumed to be the same as that of a modulation operation except that (i) the original image X in Eq. (1) is replaced by the watermarked image X m ( i i ) A in Eq. (1) is now regarded as an attack rather than a modulation operation (iii)X in Eq. (3) is an attacked image instead of a watermarked image (iv) N in Eq. (3) is resultant noise which is contributed by the Gaussian noise-like watermark n and attacks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that N is still a Gaussian distribution with variance . The value of will be small/large when the imposed attack i s w eak/strong.
Sparse Code Shrinkage (SCS) Technique
After conducting Gaussian modeling of coe cient magnitude change with respect to an attacked image, the next step is to separate the host image X from the attacked imageX by denoising N. Using the denoising operation, the estimated host image X can correctly approximate the original image, i.e., X X. In order to achieve the above mentioned goal, the I C A -based (Independent Component Analysis) sparse code shrinkage (SCS) technique 9] is employed to model the denoising problem. An SCS-based denoising algorithm includes the following steps: (i) model the noisy imagẽ X as a set of independent components (ii) perform sparse code shrinkage on these components (iii)
invert the I C Arepresentation. The step by step procedure for an I C A -based SCS denoising algorithm is given in the following.
First, one has to model the host image X using the independent component analysis process 3]. This process decides on the major components of the host image. On the other hand, we need to consider the noise part (N) consisting of minor components, which can be shrunk (soft-thresholded) using an adaptive soft threshold during the I C Aprocess. In an explicit format, the host image can be modeled as X = As, where A is a basis matrix and s is the vector of independent components (ICs). Analogous to traditional transformations, such as discrete Fourier transform or wavelet transform, s is composed of a s e t of selected transformed coe cients, and A is a synthesis lter. Therefore, I C A has the property that di erent independent components (ICs) are unlikely to be activated at the same time due to its sparse distributed nature (i.e., energy compaction). Therefore, the noisy imageX can be denoted asX = X + N = As + N: (4) Suppose only the observed dataX is given the basis matrix (A) and the 
In the second step, each noisy component, s i +Ñ i , is shrunk by the denoising operation. When we u s e sparse code shrinkage to denoise s +Ñ, we n e e d to model the distribution of each component, s i , to see whether it satis es the non-Gaussian requirement. One antecedent condition that image denoising by means of shrinkage can achieve is that each component s i must benon-Gaussian so that it can be distinguished from normal Gaussian noise. Due to the energy compact representation of an I C A model, every independent component s i is expected to exhibit sparse density. The second condition required for image denoising by shrinkage to function is that the variance of N must beassumed in advance 6]. After the sparse density of each s i is modeled, their corresponding parameters can be generated to determine a suitable shrinkage function, g i 9]. Then, one can shrink s i +Ñ i by means of g i and then get the cleaned version of s, w h i c h is represented as s, where
Generally speaking, the value of s should be very close to s. In the third step, the approximated host image X can be derived by a n i n verse I C Atransformation: X = A s. After the estimated host image is determined, it can be used for blind detection. Wavelet shrinkage 6] is a good alternative to SCS-based denoising 9] due to its capability of fast computation. In wavelet shrinkage, W and A form a pair of wavelet analysis and synthesis lters. In addition, the shrinkage function used in wavelet shrinkage is xed and is independent of the distribution of independent components. Although the denoising results obtained by applying wavelet shrinkage-based denoising are worse than those obtained by applying SCS-based denoising, their function in watermark prediction is almost the same.
The Proposed Denoising-based Oblivious Watermarking Method
In this section, we will describe the proposed method and analyze its performance. In Sec. 3.1, we shall describe in detail how a robust embedder can be designed by exploiting the knowledge of shrinkagebased watermark prediction. The processes of watermark embedding and watermark detection will be described as well. In Sec. 3.2, performance analysis of the proposed scheme will be presented. In Sec. 3.3, the relationship between our scheme and Cox et al.'s new watermarking concept 4] will be examined.
The Proposed Approach: A Non-Blind Embedder
In this section, we shall describe in detail the proposed watermarking system. Let k(i) be an element of a watermark K, and let k(i) be used to modulate a wavelet coe cient w s o (x y) as follows:
After simple reorganization, we h a ve sign(k(i)) = sign(w m s o (x y) ; w s o (x y)) (8) where sign is an operator de ned as sign(t) = 8 > < > :
In order to maintain transparency, the sign of w m s o (x y) has to be the same as that of w s o (x y). (10) which is, in essence, a denoising-based watermark detection process. As we h a ve m e n tioned previously 15], the basic requirement for obtaining a higher correlation value between k(i) andk(i) is to get them to have the same sign. In order to achieve the above goal, sign( negative, which m a k es the correlation between k(i) a n d k(i) hard to predict. This situation indicates that a watermarking scheme which adopts a typical spread-spectrum hiding strategy together with a shrinkage-based prediction rule cannot guarantee robustness. From Eq. (10), we realize that the sign of an extracted watermark is dependent on the attacked wavelet coe cient due to the nature of shrinkage-based denoising. Therefore, if we can use the knowledge derived from the denoising-based prediction side, then we can design a suitable hiding strategy. In what follows, we shall discuss how to design a good hiding strategy. It is known that a pirate will not perceptually damage an image. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the signs of w m s o (x y) a n d w a s o (x y) are the same, i.e., sign(w m s o (x y)) = sign(w a s o (x y)): (11) By combining Eqs. (8), (10) , and (11) (12) holds. This derived result is exactly the same as the e ect of positive modulation of cocktail watermarking 15]. Therefore, in this paper, only one watermark will be embedded in an image using positive modulation. In order to satisfy the requirement of transparency and robustness, the highest-frequency bands and the lowest-frequency band in the wavelet domain will not be used to hide watermarks. The proposed watermarking method is described as follows.
In the watermark hiding process, suppose that X is an image of size N M, and that an S-scale wavelet transform is performed on X. Let the wavelet coe cient to be modulated be w s o (x y), where 0 < s S. Since the highest-frequency subbands will not bewatermarked, s must belarger than 1 (the nest scale). In addition, the lowest-frequency subband located at the S-scale is usually very small in size and is non-watermarked to preserve transparency. Therefore, it is not di cult to gure out that the length of a hidden watermark (K) is about one-quarter of the original image size. Using positive modulation to hide a watermark K, w e obtain the modulated wavelet coe cient: is an image-dependent weight used to control the maximum possible modi cation that will lead to the least image quality degradation. Basically, may beselected to satisfy perceptual transparency subjectively or to make the P N S R of a watermarked image larger than a certain value objectively.
We shall see later in this section that (no matter what value it is) will not a ect the detection of watermarks.k(top(i))=k(bottom(i)) refers to a watermark value, which is retrieved from the rst/last i position (usually a negative/positive v alue) of the watermark sequenceK sorted from K in decreasing order. Under these circumstances, jw m s o (x y)j > jw s o (x y)j is always guaranteed. The above sorted results will be recorded as p(x y) = j (14) where j, denoting top(i) or bottom(i) of Eq. (13), is the index of the sorted watermark sequencẽ K. In the watermark detection process, an attacked image is rst denoised by means of a shrinkagebased denoising process. After this process is nished, the original image can beestimated. Then, the estimated original image can be used to conduct blind watermark detection by retrieving the 
Finally, the normalized correlation value is calculated to measure the similarity between K and K e by means of (K K e ) = P jjKjj i=1 sign(k(i)) sign(k e (i)) jjKjj (16) where jjKjj denotes the length of the watermark. In Eq. (16), it can beeasily checked from sign( ) function and normalized correlation that being image-dependent does not a ect the watermark detection.
It is clear that the time bottleneck in the proposed system is in the sparse code calculation. Since e ciency is a major concern in watermark detection, we shall use wavelet transform to perform the shrinkage-based denoising task 6]. Since a secret key is required to generate a hidden watermark and this hidden watermark must be sorted in the embedding process, a sorted watermark instead of a secret key needs to beprovided in the watermark detection process. This implies that the secret key (in fact, a secret sequence) is longer than those in conventional methods. In addition, we h a ve t o enforce each image to be associated with a secret sequence.
Performance Analysis
Some issues regarding performance evaluation of the proposed method are discussed in the following.
False Negative and False Positive Analysis
In our scheme, we use a threshold T to indicate the presence/absence of a watermark if a correlation value is larger/smaller than T. The error probabilities, composed of a false negative (miss detection) and a false positive (false alarm), will be used to evaluate our system. In our analysis, the distributions of the detection results with respect to attacked images (including watermarked images) and nonwatermarked images are, respectively, approximated using Gaussian probability density functions (PDFs). In fact, the detection results of attacked images are represented using a normal Gaussian distribution while those of non-watermarked images are represented using a generalized Gaussian. The statistics of the above mentioned distributions can beestimated by means of experiments. Suppose the mean and the variance of the distribution of non-watermarked images and those of the attacked images are n , 2 n and a , 2 a , respectively, with n < a . The intersection area of the two distributions is de ned as the error probability, and the intersection point of the above t wo distributions is de ned as the threshold T (;1 T 1). Then, the false negative probability can be derived as follows: 
Analysis of Denoising-based Prediction with Di erent Noise Variance
For sparse code shrinkage 9] or wavelet shrinkage 6], the variance of a noise distribution, (relevant to the denoising capability), should be determined in advance in order to separate the original image, X, from its embedded noise, N. It should be noted that the value of is hard to predict but de nitely a ects the nal reconstruction result. Fortunately, the major concern here is not the original image. What we are concerned about is the detected correlation values. Therefore, it is su cient if the watermark extracted from the estimated host image is highly correlated with the hidden watermark.
In the following, we shall evaluate the performance of the proposed system when noises with 
Similarly, the hidden watermark value k(i) satis es sign(k(i)) = sign(w m s o (x y) ; w s o (x y)): (20) Under situation (P1) and after applying sparse code shrinkage with di erent v alues of , w e can get j w s o (x y)j < jw m s o (x y)j < jw a s o (x y)j (21) when is large or jw m s o (x y)j < j w s o (x y)j < jw a s o (x y)j (22) when is small. From Eq. (21) and Eq. (22), we know that the extracted watermark will have the same sign as the hidden watermark. It is intuitive that preservation of the same sign between the value of a hidden watermark and that of an extracted watermark will be bene cial for deriving a higher correlation value. Under the conditions that (P2) is valid and that sparse code shrinkage has been executed, we can get j w s o (x y)j < jw a s o (x y)j < jw m s o (x y)j (23) whether is small or large. Again, Eq. (23) tends to help increase the correlation value, which is the same as in the case of (P1). Similarly, if the situation is (P3) and sparse code shrinkage has been executed, then we h a ve j w s o (x y)j < jw a s o (x y)j < jw m s o (x y)j (24) whether is small or large. Once again, Eq. (24) will help increase the correlation value, which is the same as in the cases of (P1) and (P2). From the above analysis, we nd that di erent values will not a ect the correlation value signi cantly because the polarity o f the value of an extracted watermark can always be kept the same as that of the original watermark.
Resistance to Denoising Attacks 12, 24]
From the above analysis, we k n o w that the predicted watermark is indeed very similar to the hidden one. 12 ] added the estimated watermark into a nonwatermarked image to create a false alarm situation. This kind of attack is a so-called \copy a t t a c k" and can be used to challenge the concept of watermarking. From the above t wo w orks, we know that a w atermark can be predicted by means of denoising and then used to create either a miss detection 24] or false alarm 12] situation. One may ask: \Does successful prediction of a watermark also imply that watermark removal can be done successfully?" Our answer is NO. W e will explain why such a n attack cannot successfully destroy a w atermark embedded using our method.
Resistance to the Denoising and Perceptual Remodulation Attack First, we will examine \denoising and remodulation attacks" 24]. Let X a be an attacked image which is obtained by applying a denoising operation to a watermarked image X m . Suppose the denoising operation is a technique such as low-pass ltering, median ltering, Wiener ltering, or shrinkage-based denoising 6, 9]. After applying the denoising operation, we will have either 
In the proposed scheme, positive modulation is applied to the original image. Therefore, we can obtain that sign(w m s o (x y) ; w s o (x y)) is equal to sign(w a s o (x y) ;w s o (x y)). This means that the overall correlation value will increase. From the above analysis, we conclude that a watermark embedded by our scheme is hard to remove using a shrinkage-based denoising algorithm.
Resistance to the Copy Attack
Next, we will examine the e ect caused by the \copy attack" 12] on our scheme. Let w 
by the signs of their corresponding wavelet coe cients. Because the property of a non-watermarked image is random in nature, it can be expected that the correlation value between the retrieved watermarkñ 2 and the hidden one n 1 will be close to zero. This means that the proposed denoising-based oblivious watermarking method (positive modulation incorporated with shrinkage-based watermark prediction) is able to resist a \copy attack" 12].
Relationship with the Concept of Watermarking as Communications with
Side Information
In 4], Cox et al. proposed a new concept which views watermarking as communications with side information. In their scheme, the embedded signal S, which is composed of an extracted signal V and a watermark K, is perceptually similar to the extracted signal to achieve delity and is highly correlated with the hidden watermark K to achieve robustness. In general, S can beobtained as a combination of V and K by a mixing function f, i.e.,
A sub-optimal way of computing S is de ned as
where ! is a weight. Recently, four di erent embeddingstrategies (including the above one) have beenproposed as \informed embedders" 17]. Their performance was compared with that of blind embedding and it was found that informed embedding is better. If our watermarking scheme is interpreted as communications with side information, then we can derive the following result:
This is because our scheme attempts to keep the signs of watermark values unchanged. In this paper, robustness can beguaranteed if the signs of watermark values remain unchanged after attacks, i.e., sign(S) = sign(K) holds. Under the assumption that an attacked image will not be perceptually di erent f r o m the original one (Eq. (11)), sign(S) = sign(V) should hold. Based on the above, Eq. (34) can bederived. Therefore, the hiding strategy should bedesigned so as to satisfy sign(V) = sign(K). This design has been realized by means of positive modulation, as expressed in Eq. (13).
Experimental Results
Five standard images of size 256 256 were used as the host images in our experiments. Using our watermarking scheme, we set the length of a hidden watermark as 16128. After watermarking was applied, the PSNR values of the ve w atermarked image were between 41 and 42 dB, and no perceptual distortion could be observed. 21 commonly used attacks were used to test the robustness of our method. These attacks included (1) blurring (2) median ltering (3) Wiener ltering (4) rescaling (5) histogram equalization (6) sharpening (7) and (8) Gaussian noise addition with di erent v ariance values (9) and (10) uniform noise addition with di erent variance values (11) mosaic e ects (12) texturizing (13) shading (14) and (15) JPEG compression with quality factors of 10% and 5% (16) and (17) Fig. 1(e) . From Fig. 1(e) , it can be found that the results obtained by applying Wiener ltering was the worst since prediction (denoising) in this case is not consistent with our modulation operation. We also found that none of the three denoising techniques could correctly predict the hidden watermark from an attacked image with the shading e ect (13-th attack). The reason why the shading e ect attack could succeed was that the signs of most of the chosen coe cients changed. As a result, the predicted watermark values had signs which w ere di erent from their original ones. As we h a ve noted with respect to Eq. (11), these sign changes violate our basic assumption and, thus, degrade the correlation value. Fig.  1(f) shows the result of the uniqueness test when the famous StirMark attack was applied.
In the second group of experiments, we applied SPIHTcompression with di erent compression ratios to see how the correlation value was a ected. Fig. 2 shows a curve which re ects the change of the detector response under di erent compression ratios. It is apparent that when the ratio was small, its corresponding detector response was large. When the compression ratio reached 128 : 1, the corresponding detector response dropped to 0:2.
In the third group of experiments, we obtain false positive and false negative n umerical results. In Fig. 3(a) , we compare the detection results obtained by applying 21 attacks to the ve host images.
We nd that the ve curves are very consistent. A Gaussian distribution was used to approximate these 110 detection results, as shown in Fig. 3(b) . In addition, the detection results obtained from 90 non-watermarked images were also approximated by means of another Gaussian distribution, as shown on the left hand side of Fig. 3(c) . The distribution shown on the right hand side of Fig.  3 (c) was a redrawn version of Fig. 3(b) . It is clear that the distribution formed by the 90 nonwatermarked images was a sharp peak clustered around a detection value close to zero. On the other hand, the distribution formed by the 5 watermarked images and 105 attacked images was an obtuse curve centered at a detection value close to 0:5. According to the results of our experiments, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution formed by the 90 watermarked but non-attacked images were 0:94 and 0:04, respectively. On the other hand, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution formed by the 90 non-watermarked images were 0:00 and 0:01, respectively. Based on Eqs. (17) and (18), a threshold could be easily determined to obtain that both the false negative a n d the false positive were negligibly small under a non-attack situation. However, when attacks were imposed, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution formed by the 110 attacked images were 0:54 and 0:24, respectively. Under these circumstances, bothfalse negative and false positive were expected to increase no matter what the threshold T was. In Table 1 , we s h o w the false negative a n d the false positive probabilities corresponding to di erent threshold values.
Finally, we conducted experiments to see how a \denoising and remodulation attack" 24] and a \copy attack" 12] would a ect the proposed scheme. First, the hidden watermark was predicted from the watermarked image shown in Fig. 1(b) using Wiener ltering 13]. The predicted watermark was shown in Fig. 4(a) . As for the \denoising and remodulation attack," the predicted watermark was subtracted from the watermarked image to which it belonged ( Fig. 1(b) ). Since our objective was to demonstrate how to remove the predicted watermark, the transparency issue was not a major concern. Therefore, the predicted watermark was directly subtracted from Fig. 1(b) , and the dewatermarked image is shown in Fig. 4(b) . In addition, the predicted watermark was also triplicated and then subtracted to yield a de-watermarked image, as shown in Fig. 4(c) . As expected, Fig. 4(c) is less transparent than Fig. 4(b) . However, the detection results obtained from Figs. 4(b) and (c) show that the hidden watermark still survived with a high correlation value ( 0:79). This implies that the proposed scheme is insensitive t o the weight added to the predicted watermark which i s to beremoved. This phenomenon clearly indicates that our scheme is able to preserve the signs of the watermark values. In addition, the predicted watermarks with di erent weights were added to the non-watermarked \Lenna" image, as shown in Figs. 4(d) and (e), to examine the e ect caused by a \copy attack." Similarly, the detection results reveal that no watermark was detected when our scheme was applied (the detection values were close to zero). That is, the false positive problem did not occur.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel watermarking approach, called the \non-blind" embedder, has been applied by exploiting the available information of denoising-based watermark prediction. We h a ve found that the information obtained using shrinkage-based denoising (soft-thresholding) techniques is easy to control, and, that denoising itself is, in fact, a solution for oblivious watermark detection. The knowledge at the detector side can then be utilized to design a \non-blind" embedder, which is extremely di erent from the common blind embedder. On the other hand, the predicted watermark can be purposely used to remove a hidden watermark or to confuse judgement about legal ownership. Therefore, we have conducted analysis to con rm that our method indeed can resist the \denoising and remodulation attack" and the \copy attack." The performance of our scheme, composed of a non-blind embedder and a blind detector, has also been analyzed regarding false negative and false positive probabilities.
At the present, it still is not possible for a watermarking scheme to resist all attacks because attackers are always smarter and one step ahead. Therefore, our rst future work will focus on the problem of geometric attack resistance 14, 19] , which has not been treated in this paper. In addition, we simply use the watermark with a 1-bit payload to indicate its presence or absence. Longer payload 2] should be implemented in order to provide richer information about the owner's a liation. Finally, the public-key detection 7] and ownership deadlock problems 5] should also bestudied in order to obtain a complete, practical watermarking system. Figure 4 : The e ects of the \denoising and remodulation attack" 24] and the \copy a t t a c k" 12]: (a) the predicted watermark of Fig. 1(b) using the adaptive Wiener lter 13] (b) (c) the watermarked images with the predicted watermark (a) removed using di erent weights (d) (e) the predicted watermark (a) added into a non-watermarked image using di erent w eights.
